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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The state appeals from the district court's intermediate appellate decision 
that reversed Wilks' conviction for maintaining junk motor vehicles on residential 
property, in violation of a Fruitland city ordinance. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 1950, Wilks' parents, Jack and Evelyn Wilks, purchased real property in 
Payette County. (Tr., p.1 00, Ls.15-19; Defendant's Exhibit G.) The property was 
annexed into the City of Fruitland in 1967 and was zoned for single family 
residential use. (Tr., p.8, L.20 - p.9, L.5, p.13, Ls.1-17; Defendant's Exhibit N.) 
In 1973, the Fruitland City Council passed an ordinance making it unlawful for 
any person to maintain a junk motor vehicle on residential property for a period 
of more than 30 days. Fruitland City Code § 8-28-2 (included in record as 
Defendant's Exhibit 0). Three years later, the city council passed an ordinance 
making it unlawful for the owner (or agent thereof), tenant or occupant of any 
real property located within the Fruitland city limits to "permit or allow upon said 
real property .,. any noxious, deleterious, harmful and/or unhealthy growths of 
weeds which exceed eight inches (8") in height." Fruitland City Code § 8-2A-1 (A) 
(included in record as Defendant's Exhibit P). 
In June 2010, Fruitland City Police Chief J.D. Huff received complaints 
about the growth of weeds and the storage of junk motor vehicles on the 
Wilkses' property. (Tr., p.61, L.17 - p.62, L.18.) Chief Huff visited the property 
and personally observed that the weeds on the property were over eight inches 
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high. (Tr., p.62, L.19 - p.63, L.3, p.63, Ls.18-24.) He also observed several junk 
motor vehicles,1 including one with a tree growing through it. (Tr., p.63, Ls.3-7.) 
At Chief Huffs request, another officer visited the property and attempted to 
make contact with Wilks. (Tr., p.31, L.22 - p.33, L.5.) While on the property, the 
officer also observed the tall weeds and junk vehicles and took photographs of 
the same. (Tr., p.33, L.12 - p.38, L.9; State's Exhibit 1.) 
Ultimately, the state charged Wilks with maintaining junk motor vehicles 
on residential property, in violation of Fruitland City Code § 8-2B-2, and with 
allowing the growth of deleterious, harmful or unhealthy weeds, in violation of 
Fruitland City Code § 8-2A-1. (R., pp.5, 8-9.) At trial, several neighboring 
residents testified about the condition of the Wilkses' property, including the 
accumulation of more and more junk motor vehicles on the property over a 
period of several years. (Tr., p.44, L.5 - p.50, L.18, p.51, L.8 - p.54, L.7, p.55, 
L.1 - p.58, L.15, p.59, L.9 - p.61, L.2.) City officials also testified that there had 
1 Fruitland City Code § 8-2B-1 defines a "junk motor vehicle" as: 
an unsightly motor vehicle or a part or parts therefrom, or one that 
does not have a current valid state registration and license plate, or 
one that is not currently covered by minimum liability insurance in 
an amount required by the state of Idaho, or one that cannot be 
safely operated under its own power, or one that does not have any 
one of the following: foot brakes, hand brakes, headlights, 
taillights, horn, muffler, rear-view mirrors, windshield wipers or 
adequate fenders. 
The magistrate found, and Wilks has never disputed, that the vehicles at issue in 
this case qualify as "junk motor vehicles" under this ordinance. (See Tr., p.118, 
LS.13-17 ("Wilks is in violation of [the ordinance] by having junk vehicles that 
belong to him that are on the property that are not licensed, not registered, not 
operable, and not behind a fence or in a building.").) 
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been junk vehicles on the property for several years and that, despite being 
served with numerous notices informing him of the ordinance violation, Wilks 
never removed the junk vehicles from the property. (Tr., p.20, L.14 - p.21, L.3, 
Tr., p.21, L.13 - p.23, L.14, p.25 L.18 - p.28, L.16, p.29, L.20 - p.30, L.21.) 
Wilks testified that the residential property is still owned by his parents 
and that he has no present ownership interest in it.2 (Tr., p.109, L.13 - p.110, 
L.12.) However, he does own most of the vehicles that are on the property. (Tr., 
p.104, Ls.7-19, p.110, Ls.10-14.) According to Wilks, his father began collecting 
vehicles and storing them on the property in 1950 (Tr., p.83, Ls.15-23, p.91, L.21 
- p.92, L.10); he testified, "Dad would like at one time have different cars there, 
and then he'd make a deal to get rid of them" (Tr., p.92, Ls.4-6). Wilks started 
collecting vehicles and storing them on the property in 1962. (Tr., p.83, Ls.15-
17.) He "had dreams of fixing a lot of them up," and "every once in a while" he 
sold one of them, but some of the vehicles have been sitting on the property for 
up to 50 years. (Tr., p.84, Ls.20-24, p.92, L.22 - p.93, L.3, p.1 01, L.25 - p.1 02, 
L.6, p.106, Ls.5-13.) Neither Wilks nor his father ever had a license to be a 
"co"ector or dismantler" or to operate a junkyard on the property. (Tr., p.102, 
L.25 - p.1 03, L.17.) 
At the conclusion of the evidence, Wilks moved to dismiss the junk motor 
vehicle charge, arguing the storage of junk vehicles on his parents' property 
constituted a constitutionally protected, preexisting nonconforming use. (Tr., 
2 Wilks' father passed away in May 2010. (Tr., p.100, Ls.20-24.) Wilks testified 
that, apart from his sister, he is the only heir to his parents' property. (Tr., p.1 00, 
L.15-p.101, L.24.) 
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p.112, L.23 - p.114, LA.) The magistrate denied the motion and found Wilks 
guilty of maintaining junk motor vehicles on residential property. (Tr., p.118, 
Ls.1-21, p.121, Ls.1-2; R., p.22.) The court found Wilks not guilty of violating the 
city weed ordinance because there was no evidence that Wilks owned the real 
property or was otherwise responsible for maintaining it. (Tr., p.120, L.22 -
p.121, L.1; R., p.23.) 
Wilks timely appealed to the district court. (R., pp.26-27) The district 
court reversed Wilks' conviction for violating the junk motor vehicle ordinance, 
concluding that Wilks' use of his parents' property "for the storage, salvage and 
sale" of junk vehicles "is a constitutionally protected pre-existing non-conforming 
use and as such is protected under Idaho law." (R., pp.58-64.) The state timely 
appealed. (R., pp.65-67.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in reversing the magistrate's judgment finding Wilks 
guilty of maintaining junk motor vehicles on residential property, in violation of 
Fruitland City Code § 8-28-2(8)? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Reversing Wilks' Conviction For Maintaining Junk 
Motor Vehicles On Residential Property 
A. Introduction 
Wilks was charged with maintaining junk motor vehicles on residential 
property, in violation of Fruitland City Code § 8-2B-2, which provides in relevant 
part: "It shall be unlawful for any person to maintain a junk motor vehicle, 
vehicles, or parts thereof on residential property or business property for a period 
of more than thirty (30) days." Fruitland City Code § 8-2B-2(B).3 The magistrate 
found Wilks guilty of the ordinance violation, but the district court reversed, 
concluding that Wilks' use of his parents' property "for the storage, salvage and 
sale" of junk vehicles "is a constitutionally protected pre-existing non-conforming 
use and as such is protected under Idaho law." (R., pp.62-63 (footnote 
omitted).) The district court erred for several alternative reasons. 
First, Wilks does not own the real property in question and, as such, has 
no standing to assert a due process violation resulting from the enforcement of 
the ordinance. Second, even if Wilks has standing, the district court erred in 
concluding that the Wilkses' incidental use of the property to store and 
3 There are exceptions to the prohibition against maintaining junk motor vehicles 
on residential property, including where the vehicle is "completely enclosed 
within a building in a lawful manner where it is not visible from the street or other 
public or private property." Fruitland City Code § 8-2B-3(A). See also Id. §§ 8-
2B-3(B) (exception for vehicles stored or parked on private property in 
connection with business of licensed dismantler, vehicle dealer or junk dealer, or 
where necessary to operation of lawfully conducted business or commercial 
enterprise) and 8-2B-3(C) (exception for regularly used recreational vehicles and 
vehicles owned by active duty military personnel stationed outside the state). It 
is undisputed, however, that none of the exceptions apply in this case. 
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occasionally sell junk motor vehicles was a valid preexisting nonconforming use 
that was exempt from the requirements of the junk motor vehicle ordinance. 
Third, even assuming the storage and occasional sale of junk motor vehicles 
was a valid preexisting nonconforming use, Wilks' current use of the property as 
a glorified junkyard constitutes an expansion of the nonconforming use and is 
therefore subject to the requirements of the ordinance. Finally, even if Wilks' 
current use of the property is merely a continuation of a preexisting 
nonconforming use, enforcement of the ordinance against him does not violate 
due process because Wilks' right to continue a nonconforming use is subservient 
to the city's lawful exercise of police power. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision to determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it on 
appeal." Borely v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176,233 P.3d 102, 107 (2010) (citing 
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 126, 219 P.3d 448, 
450 (2009); see also Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
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C. Wilks Lacks Standing To Assert A Due Process Violation Resulting From 
Enforcement Of The Ordinance 
The district court reversed Wilks' conviction for maintaining junk motor 
vehicles on residential property based upon its determination that the 
enforcement of the ordinance against Wilks violated his due process right to 
continue what the court deemed to be a valid preexisting nonconforming use of 
his parents' property. (R, pp.58-63.) The district court erred because Wilks 
does not own the real property in question and, as such, has no standing to 
claim a due process violation.4 
In the context of zoning and land use cases, the term "nonconforming 
use" means "a use of land which lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a 
zoning ordinance and which is maintained after the effective date of the 
ordinance even though not in compliance with use restrictions." Baxter v. City of 
Preston, 115 Idaho 607,608-09,768 P.2d 1340, 1341-42 (1989), cited in Eddins 
v. City of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30,34,244 P.3d 174, 178 (2010). "As a general 
proposition, the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions 
require that once a zoning ordinance is enacted, nonconforming uses be allowed 
to continue." lsl at 609, 768 P.2d at 1342 (citations omitted); see also Heck v. 
Commissioners of Canyon Co., 123 Idaho 826, 829, 853 P.2d 571, 574 (1993) 
(quoting O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 42-43, 202 P.2d 401, 404 
4 The state raised the standing issue both to the trial court and to the district 
court in its appellate capacity. (See Tr., p.114, L.13 - p.115, L.13, p.116, LS.15-
23; R, pp.43-44.) However, neither court addressed the issue in reaching their 
respective decisions. (See generally Tr., p.118, Ls.1-21, p.120, L.22 - p.121, 
L.2; R, pp.58-63.) 
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1949» ("The right to use one's property in a lawful manner is within the 
protection of subdivision (1) of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States and Article I, Sec. 13 of the Idaho Constitution providing that no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."); 
Bastian v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 307, 309, 658 P.2d 978, 980 (Ct. App. 
1983) (citation omitted) ("The right to continue a nonconforming use or 
improvement of property derives from the due process clauses of the state and 
federal constitutions."). The right to a nonconforming use is not a personal right; 
rather, it is a property right that "runs with the land." 62 AmJur Trials 1, § 11 
(2012). The right thus "simply protects the owner from abrupt termination of 
what had been a lawful condition or activity on the property." Baxter, 115 Idaho 
at 609, 768 P.2d at 1342 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
Application of the above legal principles to the facts of this case shows 
that Wilks has no standing to claim a due process violation resulting from the 
enforcement of the junk motor vehicle ordinance. The due process protections 
associated with the continuation of a nonconforming use extend only to "owners" 
of the property. Baxter, 115 Idaho at 609, 768 P.2d at 1342; O'Connor, 69 Idaho 
at 42-43, 202 P.2d at 404 ("right to use one's property in a lawful manner is" 
protected by due process clauses of federal and state constitutions) (emphasis 
added). Wilks' due process rights are not implicated by the enforcement of the 
ordinance because he has no legally cognizable interest in the residential 
property at issue. It is undisputed that Wilks is not the owner of the property; his 
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parents purchased the property in 1950 and, at least as of the time of trial, the 
deed to the property remained in their names. (Tr., p.100, LS.15-19, p.109, 
Ls.13-22; Defendant's Exhibits G and M.) Wilks is a potential heir to the property 
but, as he conceded at trial, he has no present ownership interest in it. (Tr., 
p.100, L.15 - p.1 01, L.24, p.109, L.23 - p.11 0, L.12.) Because Wilks has no 
property right at stake, he has no standing to assert a due process violation 
resulting from enforcement of the ordinance.5 The district court's appellate 
decision reversing Wilks' conviction based on a purported violation of Wilks' due 
process rights should be reversed. 
D. Even If Wilks Has Standing, The District Court Erred In Concluding That 
The Former Use Of The Property To Store And Occasionally Sell Junk 
Motor Vehicles Constituted A Valid Preexisting Nonconforming Use 
"When land is lawfully used or improved in a way that conflicts with 
requirements of a subsequently enacted zoning ordinance, the property is said to 
be nonconforming." Bastian v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 307,308,658 P.2d 
978, 979 (Ct. App. 1983). "The owner of a lawful nonconforming use has a right 
to continue that use despite the conflicting provisions of the subsequently 
enacted zoning ordinance." Glengarv-Gamlin Protective Association, Inc. v. Bird, 
106 Idaho 84, 89, 675 P.2d 344,349 (Ct. App. 1983). The Idaho Supreme Court 
has made clear, however, that a nonconforming use protects only the 
5 It should also be noted that enforcement of the ordinance against Wilks does 
not deprive him of any personal property. As noted by the magistrate, "Mr. Wilks 
is not being prohibited from owning junk vehicles. He is not prohibited from 
owning as many junk vehicles as he wants to own." (Tr., p.118, Ls.3-5.) The 
ordinance simply requires that Wilks store his junk vehicles in a manner that 
does not cause a nuisance. Fruitland City Code §§ 8-2B-2 and 8-2B-3. 
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'''fundamental or primary use of the real property in question.'" Eddins, 150 
Idaho 30,35,244 P.3d 174, 179 (2010) (quoting Lewis-Clark Memorial Gardens, 
Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 99 Idaho 680, 587 P.2d 821 (1978)). Thus, where the 
owner of a manufactured home park used the property primarily to rent spaces 
for both manufactured homes and recreational vehicles, the rental of spaces for 
recreational vehicles was a constitutionally protected preexisting nonconforming 
use that the landowner was entitled to continue despite the passage of an 
ordinance prohibiting the placement of recreational vehicles in manufactured 
home parks. Eddins, 150 Idaho at 35, 244 P.3d at 179; see also Lewis-Clark 
Memorial Gardens, 99 Idaho at 681, 587 P.2d at 822 (pouring of concrete crypts 
was integral to preexisting primary use of property as a cemetery and therefore 
permitted to continue despite zoning ordinance prohibiting cemeteries and 
manufacturing of any kind). In contrast, where landowners aspired to operate an 
auto repair and salvage business on a tract of property being used as a mobile 
home park but did begin operating the repair shop or otherwise rely to their 
detriment on zoning laws prior to annexation, the repair shop did not constitute a 
preexisting nonconforming use of the property. City Of Lewiston v. Bergamo, 
119 Idaho 221, 224-25, 804 P.2d 1352, 1355-56 (et. App. 1990). 
The district court concluded that the Wilkses' use of their property, before 
the junk motor vehicle ordinance was enacted, to store, salvage and sell junk 
motor vehicles was a preexisting nonconforming use of property that Wilks had 
the right to continue despite the conflicting provisions of the subsequently 
enacted junk motor vehicle ordinance. (R., pp.62-63.) The district court erred. 
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Even assuming Wilks had standing to assert a nonconforming use defense, he 
failed to demonstrate that any protected nonconforming use existed before the 
enactment of the ordinance. 
The evidence at trial established that, before the junk motor vehicle 
ordinance was enacted in 1973, Wilks and his family used the real property 
primarily as their place of residence. (Tr., p.82, L.15 - p.83, L.11; see also R., 
p.62 ("The property was originally purchased in 1950 ... and has primarily been 
used as the Wilks' residence.").) Wilks and his father also used the property to 
collect, store and occasionally sell motor vehicles (Tr., p.83, L.15 - p.84, L.3, 
p.91, L.21 - p.93, L.3, p.101, L.25 - p.102, L.6); and his mother at one time had 
a license to run an antique business from the property (Tr., p.102, Ls.7-10, 
p. 1 03, L.19 - p.1 04, L.6). However, neither Wilks nor his parents ever had any 
sort of license to be collectors, dismantlers or dealers of junk motor vehicles (Tr., 
p.102, L.25 - p.103, L.18), nor did Wilks present any evidence that the real 
property was ever used primarily for any of those purposes. Instead, the 
evidence showed, and the district court concluded, that the primary and/or 
fundamental use of the real property was residential. (Tr., p.82, L.15 - p.83, 
L.11; R., p.62.) Because the Wilkses' use of the property to store and 
occasionally sell motor vehicles before 1973 was, at best, only incidental to their 
primary use of the property as a residence, it was not a protected preexisting 
nonconforming use under Idaho law. U, Eddins, 150 Idaho at 35, 244 P .3d at 
179 ("a nonconforming use protects the fundamental or primary use of the real 
property in question") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Accordingly, Wilks had no right to "continue" such use in violation of the 
subsequently enacted ordinance. 
E. Even Assuming A Valid Preexisting Nonconforming Use, The District 
Court Erred In Concluding That Wilks Has Not Substantially Enlarged And 
Expanded The Character Of The Use In Violation Of The Junk Motor 
Vehicle Ordinance 
As previously set forth, a "nonconforming use" is "a use of land which 
lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance and which is 
maintained after the effective date of the ordinance even though not in 
compliance with use restrictions." Baxter v. City of Preston, 115 Idaho 607, 608-
09, 768 P.2d 1340, 1341-42 (1989), cited in Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 
Idaho 30, 34, 244 P.3d 174, 178 (2010). The right of a property owner to 
continue a nonconforming use after enactment of an ordinance prohibiting such 
use is protected by due process, but this right "is not without limitation." Eddins, 
150 Idaho at 34, 244 P.3d at 178. A nonconforming use protects only the 
'''fundamental or primary use of the real property in question.'" Eddins, 150 
Idaho 30, 35,244 P.3d 174, 179 (2010) (quoting Lewis-Clark Memorial Gardens, 
Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 99 Idaho 680, 587 P.2d 821 (1978)). Moreover, it is 
firmly established policy that "nonconforming uses should not be allowed to 
expand and eventually should be eliminated." Ada County v. Schemm, 96 Idaho 
396,398, 529 P.2d 1268, 1270 (1974), quoted in Eddins, 150 Idaho at 34,244 
P.3d at 178. Thus, "[t]he owner of a nonconforming use may lose the protected 
grandfather right if the use is enlarged or expanded in violation of a valid zoning 
ordinance." Baxter, 115 Idaho at 609, 768 P.2d at 1342 (citation omitted). 
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In deciding whether a nonconforming use has been expanded or 
enlarged, the Idaho Supreme Court has "adopt[ed] a flexible approach which 
focuses on the character of the expansion and enlargement of the 
nonconforming use on a case by case basis." Baxter, 115 Idaho at 609, 768 
P .2d at 1342, quoted in Eddins, 150 Idaho at 34, 244 P .3d at 178. In conducting 
this analysis, the Court "focus[es] on the particular character of the 
nonconforming use and whether the use was the same before and after the 
passage of the zoning ordinance." Eddins, 150 Idaho at 34, 244 P.3d at 178 
(citing Baxter, 115 Idaho at 609, 768 P.2d at 1342). "As a general rule, the mere 
'intensification' of a nonconforming use does not render it unlawful." Baxter, 115 
Idaho at 609, 768 P.2d at 1342 (citations omitted), quoted in Eddins, 150 Idaho 
at 34, 244 P.3d at 178. There is, however, no due process right to expand or 
enlarge a nonconforming use beyond what had been a lawful condition or activity 
on the property before the passage of the zoning ordinance. Eddins, 150 Idaho 
at 34,244 P.3d at 178,115 Idaho at 609-10,768 P.2d at 1342-43. 
The difference between a mere continuation or intensification of a 
nonconforming use and an expansion or enlargement of such use is illustrated in 
several Idaho cases. For example, in Lewis-Clark Memorial Gardens, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that the construction of above-ground burial crypts did not 
constitute an expansion or enlargerl!ent of a private cemetery because "[t]he 
pouring of crypts above ground for subsequent burial for interment of the human 
dead did not result in any basic change in the fundamental or primary use of the 
real property in question." 99 Idaho at 681, 587 P.2d at 822. The Court reached 
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a similar conclusion in Eddins, holding that the "act of replacing an existing 
recreational vehicle with a new recreational vehicle" in a manufactured home 
park dedicated to the rental of spaces for both manufactured homes and 
recreational vehicles did "nothing to change the fundamental use of the property" 
and, as such, did not constitute an enlargement or expansion of the preexisting 
nonconforming use. 150 Idaho at 35-36, 244 P.3d at 179-80. Contrarily, the 
Court held in Baxter that in addition to having an adverse affect on the 
neighboring property owners' use and enjoyment of their properties, the 
establishment of a year-round feedlot on property formerly used to graze cattle in 
nonwinter months so changed the character of the property's use that it 
constituted an expansion and enlargement of the use in violation of a zoning 
ordinance. 115 Idaho at 610-11, 768 P .2d at 1343-44. 
The district court cited the above cases and, relying specifically on Lewis-
Clark Memorial Gardens, concluded that Wilks has not expanded the use of his 
parents' property in violation of the junk motor vehicle ordinance. (R., pp.61-62.) 
The court concluded that "Wilks and his father used this property before and 
after the passage of this ordinance for the storage, salvage and sale of vehicles," 
and "the primary use has remained constant, the storage of vehicles for salvage 
and resale." (R., p.62.) The district court erred. As set forth in the preceding 
section, the evidence presented at trial showed that, before the passage of the 
ordinance, the "storage, salvage and sale of vehicles" was never the primary use 
of the property; the Wilkses used the property primarily as a residence and, as 
such, the incidental use of the property to store, salvage and sell motor vehicles 
15 
was not a protected preexisting nonconforming use under Idaho law. See 
Section 0, supra. Even assuming the storage, salvage and sale of junk motor 
vehicles constituted a protected preexisting nonconforming use, the district 
court's appellate reversal on the basis that that Wilks has merely continued such 
use and has not unlawfully expanded and enlarged the prior use in violation of 
the junk motor vehicle ordinance is erroneous. 
Wilks testified at trial that, before the passage of the junk motor vehicle 
ordinance, he and his father collected and occasionally sold vehicles on the 
property. (Tr., p.83, L.15 - p.84, L.3, p.91, L.21 - p.39, L.3, p.1 01, L.25 - p.1 02, 
L.6.) The district court found that Wilks has simply continued that use, stating 
that Wilks' use of the property for "the storage of vehicles for salvage and resale" 
has "remained constant" (R., p.62), and that Wilks "profits from the sale of 
vehicles and parts, a business venture that he operates from the use of his 
mother's property" (R., p.59). These were not facts found by the trial court and 
are without support in the evidence. The evidence at trial, including Wilks' own 
testimony, established that Wilks has accumulated numerous junk motor 
vehicles on the property over the past 50 years. (Tr., p.25, L.18 - p.27, L.17, 
p.46, L.6 - pA7, L.18, p.48, Ls.17-23, p.53, Ls.1-19, p.57, L.2 - p.58, L.15, p.91, 
L.16 - p.92, L.19, p.101, L.25 - p.102, L.6, p.107, Ls.12-25.) Wilks testified that 
he "had dreams of fixing a lot of them up," or of selling them to somebody else 
who could fix them up (Tr., p.84, Ls.20-23) but, aside from Wilks' vague 
testimony that "every once in a while I'd turn something all right [sic]" (Tr., p.92, 
L.25 - p.93, L.3), there is no evidence that Wilks ever profited from the sale of a 
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vehicle since the junk motor vehicle ordinance was passed in 1973. Certainly, 
there is no evidence that Wilks operates a "business venture" from the property; 
Wilks himself testified that he does not keep any kind of written inventory and 
that his main purpose in collecting junk motor vehicles on the property is his own 
affinity "for vehicles ... and the history of them." (Tr., p.93, Ls.4-S, p.107, L.16-
p.10S, L.3.) 
The evidence also does not support the district court's conclusion that 
Wilks has not unlawfully expanded the use of the property beyond the "storage 
of vehicles for savage and resale." More than one witness testified that the 
Wilkses' property is now nothing more than a glorified junkyard; no one 
continuously resides at the property, the property is "stacked" with "vehicles and 
car parts and stuff," and at least one vehicle on the property has a tree growing 
through it. (Tr., p.21, Ls.1-3, p.25, L.1S - p.2S, L.7, p.46, L.6 - p.47, L.1S, p.53, 
Ls.1-13, p.56, Ls.17-21, p.57, L.5 - p.5S, L.12, p.60, Ls.15-22, p.63, Ls.1-7, 
p.10S, L.4 - p.1 09, L.12.) In addition, neighboring property owners testified that 
the condition of the property due to weeds and the accumulation of junk motor 
vehicles has adversely affected both the use and enjoyment of their own 
properties and the value of their properties for resale. (Tr., p.47, L.19 - p.4S, 
L.5, p.53, L.25 - p.54, L.7, p.56-57.) 
Contrary to the district court's determination, a review of the evidence 
shows that Wilks' current use of his parents' property to store junk motor vehicles 
is not merely a continuation or intensification of any valid preexisting 
nonconforming use. Wilks fundamentally changed the nature of the use from 
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collecting vehicles "for salvage and resale" to accumulating more and more junk 
motor vehicles on the property without ever salvaging, selling or otherwise 
disposing of them, and in a manner that has had an adverse impact on 
neighboring properties. The differences in the character of the use are 
substantial and constitute an unlawful expansion and enlargement of the use in 
violation of the junk motor vehicle ordinance. See Baxter, 115 Idaho at 610-11, 
768 P.2d 1343-44. The district court's appellate decision holding otherwise 
should be reversed. 
F. Even If Wilks' Current Use Of The Property Is Merely A Continuation Of A 
Valid Preexisting Nonconforming Use, Enforcement Of The Ordinance 
Against Him Does Not Violate Due Process But Is A Lawful Exercise Of 
The City's Police Power To Abate Nuisances 
Due process protects the right of property owners to use their property in 
a lawful manner, including by continuing prior nonconforming uses. Heck v. 
Commissioners of Canyon Co., 123 Idaho 826,829,853 P.2d 571, 574 (1993); 
Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 561 n.3, 468 
P.2d 290, 293 n.3 (1970); O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 42-43, 202 
P.2d 401, 404 (1949). The due process protections afforded nonconforming 
uses are absolute, however. Rather, it is well settled that the right of a property 
owner to continue a preexisting nonconforming use is subservient to the police 
power of a state or local municipality to regulate the use of the property through 
statutes or ordinances designed to protect public health and safety. Heck, 123 
Idaho at 829-30, 853 P.2d at 574-75 (citing, inter alia, Queenside Hills Realty Co. 
v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 82-83 (1946); C.D.S.! Inc. v. Village of Gates Mills, 497 
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N.E.2d 295, 298 (Ohio 1986) ("80th conforming and nonconforming uses are 
subject to ordinances and regulations of a police nature predicated upon 
protection of the public health, safety, welfare, and general good.")); Cole-
Collister Fire Protection Dist., 93 Idaho at 562,468 P.2d at 294. 
As observed by the Supreme Court, "[t]he police power is one of the least 
limitable of governmental powers, and in its operation often cuts down property 
rights." Queenside Hills Realty Co., 328 U.S. at 83, quoted in Heck, 123 Idaho at 
830, 853 P.2d 571, 575. To be a valid exercise of police power, the act in 
question must "bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare." Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist., 93 Idaho at 561, 468 P.2d 
at 294 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). If it does, and if "the act 
is not clearly unreasonable, capricious, arbitrary or discriminatory, it will be 
upheld, as a proper exercise of the police power." Heck, 123 Idaho at 830,853 
P.2d at 575 (quoting Rowe v. City of Pocatello, 70 Idaho 343,350,218 P.2d 695, 
699 (1950)). The party attacking enforcement of the ordinance bears the burden 
at the trial court level of demonstrating that the ordinance is unreasonable. Cole-
Collister Fire Protection Dist., 93 Idaho at 563, 468 P.2d at 295. 
Wilks moved to dismiss the junk motor vehicle charge on the asserted 
basis that the "enforcement of the ordinance against Defendant's use of the 
subject property is a violation of a constitutional right of due process." (R., p.20.) 
At the hearing on his motion, Wilks argued only that his use of the property to 
store junk motor vehicles was a preexisting nonconforming use protected by due 
process. (Tr., p.112, L.23 - p.114, L.4.) Citing Queensland Hills Realty Co., 
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supra, the prosecutor argued in response that, even if the storage of junk 
vehicles was a preexisting nonconforming use, such use was subservient to the 
city's legitimate exercise of police power to regulate junk yards. (Tr., p.116, LS.9-
17.) Wilks did not respond to the prosecutor's argument and did not otherwise 
argue, much less demonstrate, in the trial court that the junk motor vehicle 
ordinance was not a reasonable exercise of the city's police power. (See Tr., 
p.117, Ls.3-25.) The magistrate denied Wilks' motion and found him guilty of 
violating the junk motor vehicle ordinance, specifically finding that the ordinance 
was a lawful exercise of the city's police power. (Tr., p.118, Ls.1-21.) The court 
explained: 
With respect to the argument about constitutionality, Mr. 
Wilks is not being prohibited from owning junk vehicles. He is not 
prohibited from owning as many junk vehicles as he wants to own. 
The county and the city can adopt reasonable ordinances to 
promote the safety and welfare of the public, and that includes 
saying that if you're going to have junk vehicles you either have to 
keep them behind a fence or stored in an appropriate facility so the 
place doesn't look like a junk yard that devalues other properties in 
the neighborhood. 
So the statute is not unconstitutional, and Mr. Wilks is in 
violation of it by having junk vehicles that belong to him that are on 
the property that are not licensed, not registered, not operable, and 
not behind a fence or in a building. 
(T r., p. 11 8, Ls. 1-1 7. ) 
Without addressing the magistrate's findings (or the state's argument on 
appeal (see R., pp.46-54», the district court reversed Wilks' conviction based 
solely on its conclusion that Wilks' current use of the property "is a 
constitutionally protected pre-existing non-conforming use" (R., p.63). The 
district court erred. Even assuming Wilks' use of the property is a preexisting 
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nonconforming use, the record and the applicable law support the magistrate's 
conclusion that the enforcement of the ordinance against Wilks did not violate 
due process but was, instead, a lawful exercise of the city's police power to 
abate the nuisance caused by the storage of junk vehicles on the property. 
First, there can be no question that the ordinance itself is lawful. Article 
12, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution confers authority upon any "incorporated city or 
town [to] make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and 
other regulations as are not conflict with its charter or with the general laws." In 
addition, Idaho Code § 50-334 specifically empowers cities "to declare what shall 
be deemed nuisances" and to "prevent, remove and abate nuisances." 
Exercising this authority, the city of Fruitland has, through the adoption of 
Fruitland City Code § 8-2B-2, specifically declared the "accumulation and 
storage of junk vehicles or part on private or public property" to be a nuisance. 
Because Wilks never challenged the validity of the ordinance in the trial court, 
the ordinance, enacted pursuant to both a constitutional and statutory grant of 
authority, enjoys an presumption of legality. See Cole-Collister Fire Protection 
District, 93 Idaho at 563, 468 P.2d at 295 ("Ordinances and resolutions of a 
municipal corporation are presumed valid until the contrary is shown.") (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Second, there can also be no question that the ordinance is reasonably 
related to the protection of public health and safety and is therefore a legitimate 
exercise of the city's police power. Heck, 123 Idaho at 829-30, 853 P.2d at 574-
75; Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist., 93 Idaho at 562, 468 P.2d at 294. The 
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express purpose of the ordinance is to reduce the risk of danger associated with 
the storage of junk motor vehicles. Specifically, the ordinance provides: 
The accumulation and storage of junk vehicles or parts on 
private or public property is hereby found to create a condition 
tending to reduce the value of private property, to promote blight 
and deterioration, to invite plundering, to create fire hazards, to 
constitute an attractive nuisance creating a hazard to health, 
and safety to minors, to create a harborage for rodents and 
insects and to be injurious to the health, safety and general 
welfare. Therefore, the presence of a wrecked, dismantled or 
inoperative vehicle or parts thereof on private or public property, 
except as expressly hereinafter permitted, is declared to constitute 
a public nuisance which may be abated as such in accordance with 
the provisions of this article. 
Fruitland City Code § 8-2B-2(A) (footnoted omitted) (emphasis added). Because 
the subject matter of the ordinance is clearly with the city's police power, and 
because Wilks never argued or demonstrated below that the ordinance is 
unreasonable, capricious, arbitrary or discriminatory - either on its face or as 
applied to him - the ordinance must be upheld as a proper exercise of the city's 
police power to abate nuisances. Heck, 123 Idaho at 830,853 P.2d at 575. 
Finally, although not determinative, it is worth noting that, in addition to 
being a nuisance as a matter of law pursuant to the junk motor vehicle 
ordinance, the evidence presented at trial shows that Wilks' use of his parents' 
property to store junk motor vehicles has created a nuisance as a matter of fact. 
The city fire chief testified that he has twice been called to fires on the Wilkses' 
property (Tr., p.17, L.18 - p.18, L.5) and, on at least one of those occasions, the 
fire "was difficult to put out from the standpoint of getting manpower and 
equipment to all the areas that were burning ... because [of] all the vehicles and 
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car parts and stuff that were stacked around the property" (Tr., p.20, L.14 - p.21, 
L.3.) 
The record and the applicable law support the magistrate's conclusion 
that enforcement of the Fruitland junk motor vehicle ordinance against Wilks 
constituted a lawful exercise of the city's police power to abate the nuisance that 
exists both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact on the Wilkses' property. 
Because any due process right Wilks has to continue using the property for the 
storage of junk motor vehicles is subservient to the city's police power, the 
district court's order reversing Wilks' conviction based on a purported due 
process violation must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
appellate decision and reinstate Wilks' conviction . 
DATED this 1yth day of August 2012. 
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